G.R. No. L-9865 December 24, 1915
FACTS
It was alleged that on
September 30, 1911, plaintiff acquired at a public sale held in execution of a
judgment rendered against Ricardo Pardo y Pujol, a piece of property situated
in the municipality of Guinobatan, consisting of a frame building of strong materials
with a galvanized-iron roof, erected on a parcel of land belonging to that
municipality and intended for a public market. The plaintiff also acquired at
the sale all the right, interest, title, and participation in the said property
that appertained or might appertain to Pardo y Pujol. The said building was
constructed by virtue of a concession granted by the former Spanish government
to Ricardo Pardo y Cabañas, father of the judgment debtor.
On
January 2, 1912, the said building was totally destroyed by an accidental fire.
For several months thereafter the municipal council of Guinobatan negotiated
with plaintiff for the purchase of his rights in the said concession but such could
not be brought to a conclusion because the municipal council had allegedly acted
deceitfully, fraudulently, and in bad faith for the sole purpose of beguiling,
deceiving, and prejudicing plaintiff in order to prevent him from exercising
his right to reconstruct the burned market building and utilize it in
accordance with the terms of the said concession. The defendant municipal
council with the other defendant, Francisco Olaguera, had authorized the latter
to take possession of all the land and to occupy the same with booths or stores
for the sale of groceries and other merchandise, for billiard tables, and other
analogous.
The
plaintiff proposed to construct another public market building on the same
land, but that the defendants had prevented him from using the land and
reconstructing thereon the said public market building, and refused to
recognize plaintiff's right and to vacate the land that had been occupied by
the burned edifice.
After
filing a petition before the CFI of Albay, the provincial fiscal alleged as a
ground for the demurrer that in no part of the instrument of concession did it
appear that the privilege granted to the father of the judgment debtor had
likewise been granted to his successors or assignees, and that therefore such
rights and actions could not be conveyed to nor be acquired by any other person.
It was alleged that the building was completely destroyed by fire and that if
plaintiff's right to the possession of the land was conditioned by the
existence thereon of the said market building, such right had terminated by the
disappearance of the building.
ISSUE
Whether
a the subject building on land belonging to the municipality of Guinobatan which
was intended for a public market, by virtue of a concession could be attached
and sold for the payment of a certain debt owed by Ricardo Pardo y Pujol to a
third person who had obtained a final judgment.
RULING
No.
The land on which the building was erected and which is referred to in the
foregoing articles of the concession granted by the Government of the former
sovereignty belongs to the municipality of Guinobatan. Although the building
was constructed at the expense and with the money of the grantee, Ricardo Pardo
y Cabañas, it is, nevertheless, the property of the state or of the said
municipality, and was temporarily transferred to the grantee, Pardo y Cabañas,
in order that he might enjoy the usufruct of its floor space for forty years,
but on the termination of this period the said right of usufruct was to cease and the building was to belong finally
and absolutely to the state or the municipality in representation thereof.
For
these reasons, there is no question that the building and the land, on which it
was erected, since they did not belong to the grantee, nor do they belong to
his son and heir, Ricardo Pardo y Pujol, could not be attached or sold for the
payment of a debt contracted by the latter. The concession granted by the
former Spanish Government is personal and transferable only by inheritance, and
in no manner could it be conveyed as a special personal privilege to another
and a third person.
Ricardo Pardo y Pujol is bound to pay
his debts and his property can be attached on petition of his creditors.
However, his personal privilege of usufruct in the floor space of the public
market building of Guinobatan cannot be attached like any ordinary right,
because that would mean that a person who has contracted with the state to
furnish a service of a public character would be substituted, for another
person who took no part in the contract, and that the regular course of a
public service would be disturbed by the more or less legal action of the
creditors of a grantee, to the prejudice of the state and the public interests.
It
is indeed true that the building erected out of the private funds of the
grantee, however, judging from the agreement between him and the Government
authorities, he was granted the right to usufruct in the floor space of the
said building in order that, during the period of forty years, he might
reimburse himself for and collect the value of the building constructed by him.
So,
if neither the land nor the building in question belongs to Pardo y Pujol, it
is evident that they could not be attached or sold at public auction to satisfy
his debt and, consequently, the attachment and sale of the said Government
property executed on petition of the creditor of the said Pardo y Pujol are
notoriously illegal, null and void, and the acquisition of the property by
plaintiff confers upon him no right whatever based on the said concession.
The usufruct of the floor space of the
public market of Guinobatan, granted to Ricardo Pardo y Pujol's father was not
subject to attachment on account of its being of a public character. The only
right to which the creditor was entitled was to petition for the attachment of
the income and proceeds obtained from the use of the floor space of the market,
but he did not avail himself of this right. Therefore, the order of dismissal
appealed is in accordance with law and the merits of the case.
Comments
Post a Comment