VINUYA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010

FACTS

Petitioners narrate that during the Second World War, the Japanese army attacked villages and systematically raped the women as part of the destruction of the village. As a result of the actions of their Japanese tormentors, the petitioners have spent their lives in misery, having endured physical injuries, pain and disability, and mental emotional suffering. Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women stations in the Philippines. However, said officials declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims for compensation have already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan. Petitioners also argued that the comfort women system constituted a crime against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture. They alleged that the prohibition against these international crimes is jus cogens norms from which no derogation is possible, as such, the Philippine government is in breach of its legal obligation not to afford impunity for crimes against humanity.

ISSUE

Whether the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioner’s claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

RULING 

No. The question whether the government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the Court to overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed. In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. Even then, it is not the individuals rights that are being asserted, but rather, the states own rights. The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease.

                        The Court fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence are morally reprehensible as well as legally prohibited under contemporary international law. However, it does not automatically imply that the Philippines is under a non-derogable obligation to prosecute international crimes. Absent the consent of the states, an applicable treaty regime, or a directive by the Security Council, there is no non-derogable duty to institute proceedings against Japan. Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Even if we sidestep the question of whether jus cogens norms existed in 1951, petitioners have not deigned to show that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.