G.R. No. 160889 April 27, 2007
FACTS
FACTS
Petitioner Dr. Milagros L. Cantre is a
specialist in Obstetrics and Gynecology at the Dr. Jesus Delgado Memorial
Hospital. She was the attending physician of respondent Nora S. Go, who was
admitted at the said hospital. After Nora gave birth to her fourth child, she
suffered profuse bleeding inside her womb due to some parts of the placenta
which were not completely expelled after delivery. Consequently, Nora suffered hypovolemic shock, resulting in a drop in her
blood pressure. Petitioner and the assisting resident physician performed
various medical procedures to stop the bleeding and to restore Noras blood
pressure. While petitioner was
massaging Noras uterus for it to contract and stop bleeding, she ordered a
droplight to warm Nora and her baby. Nora remained unconscious until she
recovered.
While in the recovery room, her husband noticed a fresh gaping
wound inches in the inner portion of her left arm, close to the armpit. He
asked the nurses what caused the injury. He was informed it was a burn. Forthwith,
he filed a request for investigation. In response, the medical director of the
hospital, called petitioner and the assisting resident physician to explain
what happened. Petitioner said the blood pressure cuff caused the injury.
The husband of Nora brought her to NBI wherein the medico-legal
officer testified that the wound was caused by the droplight resulting to burn.
It was later treated through skin grafting, a kind of plastic surgery. However,
Nora’s movements were restricted and pain is constantly felt due to her injury.
Hence, prompting the spouses to file a complaint for damages against the
petitioner and the hospital. The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent
spouses which was affirmed with modifications by the CA.
ISSUE
Whether the
petitioner is liable for the injury suffered by respondent Nora Go
RULING
In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an
injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who
controls the instrument causing the injury, provided that the following
requisites concur:
1. The
accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someones negligence;
2. It
is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant
or defendants; and
3. The
possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible
is eliminated.
As to the first requirement, the gaping wound on Noras arm is
certainly not an ordinary occurrence in the act of delivering a baby, far
removed as the arm is from the organs involved in the process of giving birth.
Such injury could not have happened unless negligence had set in somewhere.
Second, whether the injury was caused by the droplight or by the
blood pressure cuff is of no moment. Both instruments are deemed within the
exclusive control of the physician in charge under the captain of the ship
doctrine. This doctrine holds the
surgeon in charge of an operation liable for the negligence of his assistants
during the time when those assistants are under the surgeons control. In this particular case, it can
be logically inferred that petitioner, the senior consultant in charge during
the delivery of Noras baby, exercised control over the assistants assigned to
both the use of the droplight and the taking of Noras blood pressure. Hence,
the use of the droplight and the blood pressure cuff is also within petitioners
exclusive control.
Third, the gaping wound on Noras left arm, by its very nature and
considering her condition, could only be caused by something external to her
and outside her control as she was unconscious while in hypovolemic shock. Hence, Nora could not, by any
stretch of the imagination, have contributed to her own injury.
Petitioners defense that Noras wound was caused not by the
droplight but by the constant taking of her blood pressure, even if the latter
was necessary given her condition, does not absolve her from liability. As
testified to by the medico-legal officer, Dr. Arizala, Jr., the medical practice is to deflate the blood
pressure cuff immediately after each use. Otherwise, the inflated band can
cause injury to the patient similar to what could have happened in this case.
Thus, if Noras wound was caused by the blood pressure cuff, then the taking of
Noras blood pressure must have been done so negligently as to have inflicted a
gaping wound on her arm, for
which petitioner cannot escape liability under the captain of the ship
doctrine.
Further, petitioners argument that the failed plastic surgery was
not intended as a cosmetic procedure, but rather as a measure to prevent
complication does not help her case. It does not negate negligence on her part.
Based on the foregoing, the presumption that petitioner was
negligent in the exercise of her profession stands unrebutted.
In this connection, the Civil Code provides:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done.
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are
the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, under the law, petitioner is obliged to pay Nora for
moral damages suffered by the latter as a proximate result of petitioner’s
negligence.
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